We remain agnostic whether reflection introduces the gap between mind and body or rather itself becomes possible because the split is already there pre-reflectively (for Husserl’s view on this, see [19]). The phenomenological anthropologic thinker, H. Plessner argues that the human condition is characterized by an ambiguous relationship to one’s own body, the fact that one can experience one’s own body as subject and object, which Plessner calls “eccentric” or “broken” positionality: “If the life of the animal is centric, then the life of the human, without able to break through this centric orientation, is, at the same time, outside it, eccentric…” [20, pp. 291-292, our translation]. Eccentric positionality, “human being-in-the-world,” is the paradoxical relationship to our own embodiment as being both embedded in situations and outside them, as external to the vital centric-viewpoint, experiencing ourselves from without [21]. That is, the ability to explicitly reflect on our experience and commonsensical mind-body dualism may emerge from the same source, human ec-centric positionality, which is already preformed via the pre-reflective structure including our body and customs as can be especially seen in addictive behaviour [22]. The ec-centric positionality is also the condition of human vulnerability to trauma [23] and psychosis [24; 25].

Table 1: Eccentric positionality and its impact for mental disturbances