Instructions for Participant A (Monetary Treatment)

Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that

10 points = 1 Euro

Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you.

There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, you are a type A participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B participant (in what follows, we call him/her B). You will never know the type of any other participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous. This means no participant will ever know which participant made which choice.

Description of the Experiment

You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points for you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points to you and 150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous. This means no participant will ever know which participant made which choice.

Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.
In the second stage of each scenario, B can affect your balance. For this, B must pay previously 5 points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then assign to you any amount of points between -100 and +100. This amount will decrease or increase your balance by the same amount. If B chooses not to pay the 5 points, she cannot assign any points to you so that the allocation chosen by you is implemented.

**Example 1:** Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you +60 points. Then you would have a balance of 150 + 60 = 210, and B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.

**Example 2:** Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you -30 points. Then you would have a balance of 390-30 = 360, and B would have 60-5 = 55 points.

Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any scenario. Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what amount of points (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if A had chosen (390, 60).

After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, note that you will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about B’s choice in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, revealing B’s identity).
Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct.

In the hypothetical example of the figure, assume the following: (a) B decides to pay the 5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 150, B: 150), and assigns then +100 points to A, (b) B decides not to pay the 5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 390, B: 60).

Taking into account all this, answer the following questions,

- What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? ______
- What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? __________
- What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ________
- What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? __________

In addition:

- Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all four scenarios?  Yes          No
- Will B know any of your effective decisions before B has made her/his decision in all four scenarios?  Yes          No
- How many scenarios has this experiment? __________
- How many scenarios will be relevant for your payment? __________
- Can B ever affect your balance without spending 5 points?     Yes       No
Decisions of a type-A participant

The 4 scenarios

For your information, we present here the point allocations available in each of the 4 scenarios. In the next sheets, you can take your decisions in each scenario.

Note: In the next sheets, you can take your decisions in any order as you wish (that is, you do not need to start deciding in scenario 1). Until we collect your decision form, moreover, you can always change your decision in any scenario if you decide so (to facilitate this, you can initially use a pencil; write down your final decision with a pen, though).
Scenario 1

Recall: 10 points = 1 Euro

The point allocation that I choose in this scenario is (select it with a circle):

- A: 250, B: 100
- A: 200, B: 150

Independently of your previous choice, we kindly ask you to make a series of estimations (your answers here will not affect your final payoff):

- What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (250, 100)? ________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included)

- In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the A-participant? ________  (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included)

- What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (200, 150)? ________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included)

- In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the A-participant? ________  (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included)
Instructions for Participant A (Non-Monetary Treatment)

Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that

10 points = 1 Euro

Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you.

There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, you are a type A participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B participant (in what follows, we call him/her B). You will never know the type of any other participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which participant made which choice.

Description of the Experiment

You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points for you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points to you and 150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B. The decisions in this experiment are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which participant made which choice.

Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.
In the second stage of each scenario, B cannot affect your balance, but can approve or disapprove your prior choice. For this, B must pay 5 points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then assign an evaluation score between -100 and +100 to you. A negative score indicates that B disapproves your choice (-100 is maximum disapproval), while a positive score indicates that B approves your choice (+100 is maximum approval). We note again that, whatever its sign, this score will not affect your balance. If B chooses not to pay the 5 points, B cannot assign a score to you.

Example 1: Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of +60 to you. That means that B approve your choice with intensity equal to 60 out of 100. Note also that your balance is unchanged (you get 150 points), whereas B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.

Example 2: Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of -30 to you. That means that B disapproves your choice with intensity equal to 30 out of 100. Note also that your balance is unchanged (you get 390 points), whereas B would get 60 – 5 = 55 points.

Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any scenario. Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what score (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if A had chosen (390, 60).

After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, note that everyone will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about the evaluation score that B assigned to you in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, revealing B’s identity).
Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct.

In the hypothetical example of the figure, suppose that A chooses allocation (A: 150, B: 150) and that B decides to pay the 5 points, and assigns then a score +100 to A. In this case:

- What would be A’s final balance? _______
- Does B approve or disapprove A’s choice? __________

![Diagram](A: 150 B: 150 A: 390 B: 60)

Suppose now that A chooses allocation (A: 390, B: 60) and that B decides not to pay the 5 points.

- What would be A’s final balance then? _______
- What would be B’s final balance then? __________

In addition:

- Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all four scenarios? Yes          No
- Will B know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four scenarios? Yes          No
- How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be relevant for your payment? __________
- Can B ever affect your balance? Yes       No